Identity Thesis Essay

Over the course of history, different theories have been formulated to attention pardon the complex equivalentnessship between the mind and the body. One of the theories elucidating the mind-body relation is dualismthe pull in that mental pleads ar independent from sensual states. Mental states be ones of cyphering, feeling, and believing whereas physiological states be those outlined by physical and biologic sciences. In contrast to dualism, physicalism insists that mental states are nearhow physical states.The most straightforward version of physicalism is the identity element dissertationthe scheme that every geek of mental state is identical to near type of physical state (Reasons and Responsibility, 285-286). Dualists and physicalists have disputed over the bindingity of the identity thesis dualists denying its claim and physicalists defending it. The biggest problem facing physicalists and the identity thesis is the supposition of qualia, the phenomenal cal ibre of a mental state (Reasons and Responsibility, 281).Philosopher plain-spoken Jackson offers what he c in all in alls the Knowledge Argument for qualia. Jacksons cognition principle presents that nonphysical facts foot be devised from facts active phenomenal quality. through and through the concept of qualia, Jacksons knowledge descent shows that the identity thesis is preposterous. The identity thesis holds that mental events are simply identical with whiz processesidentical in the comparable manner that sounds are identical with assiduity waves in the air.The thesis bases on the opinion that mental states of thought, sensation, and awareness are a similar those of physical states (such as those of the brain and central nervous system). An illustration of identity thesis is that lightning and an electric charge are two of the same thing. In other words, lightning is an electric charge. An advocate of the identity thesis is materialist gibe Carruthers. Carruthers a rgues that everything (including mental states) exists through physical causes.Carruthers argument for the identity thesis lot be summarized from the beliefs that some conscious states and events are casually necessary for the circumstance of some physical ones, and that in that respect will be no get hold of to advert to anything other than physical-physical causality in a completed neuro-physiological science. Thus, some conscious states and events are identical with physical brain states and events (Reason and Responsibility, 301-302). However, the concept of qualia refutes the idea of physicalism, and is the foundation of Jacksons knowledge argument against identity thesis.As a believer of dualism, Jackson uses the concept of qualia to support that the mind and motion are distinct and independent substances sufficient of existing without the other. Qualia are the inwrought, felt qualities of experiences. For example, one may know all the physical properties of the colou rize inflammation and the physics behind why some things are red nonetheless it is qualia that allows one to experience what it is like to actually see red. Jackson constructs his knowledge argument around the ideas of dualism and qualia.To further illustrate Jacksons argument for qualia (and dualism), the case of Fred and his unique tinct vision will be presented (Reasons and Responsibility, 298-299). For some reason, Fred has the ability to see two colors where others only see one. His retina is capable of distinguishing between two wavelengths of red in which others familiarizes with only one. He tries to explain the difference between the two reds. However he fails in doing so because others do non comprehend the difference.Therefore it is concluded that Fred can visually see one more color than everyone else. Despite having all the physical information about Fred and his special trait, one cannot know what it actually feels like to see two different types of red. Thus, Jack son believes that the physicalist left something out in the theory of physicalismthe qualia or what it feels like to actually experience something. Consequently, quale explains how dualism is valid and physicalism is incomplete.The existence of knowledge through qualia (mental state) and that of physical facts (physical state) demonstrates the idea of dualismthe view that two fundamental concepts exist. Jacksons knowledge argument derives chiefly from his thought experiment of Mary the brilliant scientist who has spent her life engrossed within a black-and-white room and has never seen colors. Mary learns all the physical facts relevant to the mind. She becomes an expert on the neurophysiology of vision and knows all there is to know about color. When Mary is released from her room, she experiences color for the first time.One would think intuitively that her color experiences provide her with knowledge she previously lacked, and that what she learns includes certain facts about w hat color experiences are like. The facts she learns upon her release cannot be physical facts because she already knew all physical facts before leaving the room. Therefore, the new knowledge comes from the concept of qualia, which indicates that not all facts are physical facts (Reason and Responsibility, 298-299). Thus physicalism is false. Jackson reaches his proof that the identity thesis is false by proving that mental states are not physical states.According to the identity thesis, states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. The concept of qualia refutes the validity of the identity thesis by presenting subjective forms of experiences. The knowledge acquired from subjective forms of experiences differs from those of physical knowledge about experiences. Since physicalism requires that all aspects of knowledge are the same, physicalism cannot be sound. Thus the identity thesis must be false. The cases of Fred and Mary show that physica lism doesnt amount to all knowledge.The sum of money of Jacksons knowledge argument can be illustrated by the following before Mary leaves the room, she knows all the physical facts about color experiences. When Mary leaves the room, she learns new facts about color experiencesfacts about what its like to see in color. Therefore, there are nonphysical facts about color experiences. Furthermore, the identity thesis is false because Jacksons knowledge argument reveals that there is something about the experience of color (in Marys case) that cannot be captured by the physicalist view.So, physicalism is incomplete. Physicalism lacks the phenomenal quality of the mental statethe ability to experience something regardless of physical knowledge. Qualia and the mental experience can never be achieved from the premises of physicalism and the identity thesis. Thus, the phenomenal quality of experiences cannot be accounted for through physical properties of the brain. In conclusion, the iden tity thesis is false because nonphysical properties, like phenomenal properties, exist.